# ROBBERY BY INTERVENTION.

## VICTORS IN RECENT WARS WHO HAVE SUFFERED FROM "REVISIONS" OF THEIR TREATIES OF PEACE.

To the people of this country, as well as the friends of the United States on yonder side of the ocean, one of the most gratifying utterances made by President McKinley is the declaration that he would permit no foreign Power to intervene between his Government and that of Spain with a view to the conclusion of the war, and that any demands for peace must be addressed by Spain herself directly to Uncle Sam without affording the slightest pretext to any ruler of the Old World to act as broker in the matter, or to demand the usual territorial fees for services thus rendered. This statement on the part of the President is all the more timely as, now that the end of the conflict is in sight, a disposition is apparent at Berlin, St. Petersburg, Paris and in other Continental capitals to subject any demands which the United States may make upon Spain as conditions of peace to the same "shaving down" process by the great Powers as that to which so many other treaties of peace have in times past been subjected. In fact, it is asserted in dispatches from Europe that an agreement has already been entered into by France, Germany, Russia and Austria, with a view to the organization of an international congress, to meet either at Berlin or at Paris, for the purpose of discussing and deciding just which of the demands made upon Spain by the United States should be conceded to the latter, and which rejected. The Congress in question would, it is mentioned, work on the same lines as that which met in 1878 in the German capital to revise the treaty of San Stefano, which marked the conclusion of the sanguinary war between Turkey and Russia, and the mere reference by the European Powers to this Berlin Congress of 1878 in connection with the one which they propose to summon for dealing with the Spanish-American treaty of peace constitutes a pretty trustworthy indication that they look forward to meting out the same shabby treatment to the United States as that which fell to the share of Russia exactly twenty years ago.

### GERMANY DEFIED THE POWERS.

It is worthy of note that with the exception of the treaty of Frankfort, which brought to a close the memorable struggle between Germany and France in 1870-'71, hardly a single nation has been permitted to enjoy the full measure of the fruits of its victories or to retain possession of what the defeated Power had been willing to concede in order to bring about the termination of the hostilities.

The most recent instance in point is that of Turkey, the victorious march of whose magnificent army of nearly half a million of men upon Athens was stopped within a few hours' distance of the Hellenic capital by an order from the Great Powers of Europe, which has now been forced not only to restore the conquered Greek province of Thessaly to King George, but likewise to consent to a reduction of the war indemnity from $50,000,000 to $10,000,000. The Greeks have not even been called upon to give up their fleet to Turkey, and, in fact, have practically lost nothing save honor and glory by their ignominious defeat at the hands of the Turks, the war indemnity having been practically paid by the Great Powers, who gave a joint guarantee for the loan raised abroad for the purpose of its settlement.

### JAPAN YIELDS TO PRESSURE.

The Mikado suffered much the same fate as the Sultan. For, as in the case of the latter, the victorious march of his magnificent army of several hundred thousand men upon the enemy's capital, namely, Peking, was stopped by a combination of Powers composed of Russia, Germany and France. Not content with this, the triumvirate of Powers in question took upon themselves to revise the treaty of Simonoseki, concluded between the Japanese and Chinese plenipotentiaries, according to the terms of which China recognized Japan's rights in Corea, and, in addition to a relatively moderate indemnity (I think the amount was about $130,000,000), consented to certain territorial concessions to Japan on the mainland of China. The triumvirate declined to permit the execution of this Simonoseki treaty, cut down the war indemnity by one-half, declined to admit Japan's rights in Corea, or the territorial concessions made to her by China on the mainland and restricted the territorial gains of Japan in connection with the war to the island of Formosa, which, owing to the savagery of the native races by which it is inhabited, or, rather, infested, has never been of any use to China and has been only a source of expenditure of vast amounts of blood and treasure to the Mikado since he obtained possession thereof.

Had Japan received at that moment the slightest hope of any backing from either the United States or from Great Britain, she would certainly never have consented to submit to such a gross piece of injustice on the part of Russia, Germany and France, who, as shown since, had in view not so much the greatly vaunted integrity of China as their own selfish interests. But finding himself quite alone, face to face with this combination of Powers, the Emperor of Japan, somewhat foolishly, in the opinion of those best able to judge, submitted to being shorn of all the fruits of his magnificent victory, almost losing his throne shortly afterward in consequence of his surrender.

Still more unjust was the treatment to which Russia herself was subjected by the treaty of Berlin of 1878, to which reference has been made above, and which, according to the Great Powers, is to serve as a basis for the revision of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain. Russia had shed rivers of blood to deliver the Balkan States from Turkish thraldom. Yet the Czar was not allowed to annex any of these States, or even to take the place of the Sultan as their suzerain. The treaty which he had concluded with Turkey at San Stefano—that is to say, within three hours' march and within sight of Constantinople, from the occupation of which she was debarred solely by the threats of British, Austrian and German intervention—was subject by the Congress to modifications most mortifying and humiliating to the Muscovite nation, and by the treaty of Berlin, which brought to a close the Congress of 1878, the Czar obtained nothing from Turkey except the promise of a war indemnity of $60,000,000, which still remains unpaid, and the Province of Bessarabia, which had belonged to him before the Crimean war, and which he now received at the expense, not of the defeated Sultan, but of Rumania, which had been Russia's valuable ally in the conflict.

This practically constituted the only return which the Czar received for all his victories obtained at the expense of so much life and treasure, whereas England, which had taken no part in the conflict, secured from the Sublime Porte the valuable island of Cyprus, and Austria the two still more important provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina for having acted the part of the brokers in revising the treaty of San Stefano. In fact, there is no doubt that both Russia and Turkey would both have been far better off to-day, territorially and financially, had there been no interference by the foreign Powers, the intervention of the latter, although nominally due to sympathy for the defeated party, being as usual dictated in reality by purely selfish considerations, and a keen eye for the broker's interests.

### OTHER NATIONS THAT HAVE SUFFERED.

Numerous other cases of the same kind could be quoted, as, for instance, when in 1885 Prince Alexander of Bulgaria, having not only repelled a Servian invasion, but likewise driven back the enemy across his borders and inflicted a most crushing defeat upon King Milan at the battle of Slivinitza, was stopped in his victorious advance upon Belgrade within a day's march of the Servian capital by a peremptory demand of the Great Powers, and was compelled to evacuate Servian territory without retaining any of the fruits of his victories. In the Austro-Prussian war of 1866 Prince Bismarck, in spite of the brilliant successes of the Prussian forces and the disastrous defeat of the Austrians at every point, was compelled to submit to the intervention of France, which, although the matter is intentionally ignored by most German historians, practically prevented the capture and occupation of Vienna by the Prussians, who were within less than two days' march of the Austrian capital when Emperor Napoleon's emissaries arrived at the Prussian headquarters.

The original demands made by Prussia were considerably modified through France's threats to secure by force territorial compensation if they were maintained, and Austria, instead of being compelled to surrender Venice and the Province of Venetia directly to Italy, which had been Prussia's ally, was permitted to avoid this humiliation by transferring the so-called "Jewel of the Adriatic" to France, which in turn made it over to King Victor Emmanuel. There is no doubt that Austria, as well as the Southern German States, such as Bavaria, Saxony, Wurtemberg, etc., benefited largely by Napoleon's intervention, and that he in consequence thereof relied on their co-operation against Prussia in the war of 1870. How he was disappointed in these expectations, as well as in the hope of help from Italy, which owed its existence in its present form so largely to him and to France, is a matter of history.

### THE REVENGE OF FRANCE.

Let me add that France's intervention in 1866 was merely a sort of revenge for Prussia's threatened intervention in 1859, a menace which brought the war between France and Italy on the one side and Austria on the other to a premature close. The Franco-Italian forces had inflicted the most crushing defeat upon the Austrians at Solferino and elsewhere, and King Victor Emmanuel, as well as his fellow-Italian patriots, felt that they were about to realize the dream of their life, namely, the sweeping out of existence of all the petty sovereignties of the Peninsula, and the amalgamation thereof into one kingdom of United Italy. This would have inevitably taken place at that time had it not been for the interference of Prussia, with menaces of a demand for territorial compensation or of marching to the assistance of the Austrians. These threats led to a hastily concluded treaty of peace at Villafranca, whereby Italy obtained nothing but Lombardy, which she had already conquered previous to the arrival of French assistance, but was obliged to abandon for the nonce her prospects of obtaining Rome, Tuscany, Parma and Modena.

An international congress at Paris likewise followed the Crimean War, when the original conditions of peace imposed by the allied Powers upon Russia underwent serious modification.

### "REVISION" FOR UNCLE SAM.

From this it will be seen that there is plenty of precedent for the action of the great Powers of Continental Europe in putting forward a demand to revise, nominally on the ground of humanity, but in reality in behalf of their own interests, the conditions of peace imposed upon Spain by the United States. They might possibly refrain from any such action, if America were to remain content with the conquest of Cuba and Porto Rico, and to undertake to restore the Philippines to Spain after the payment of a war indemnity. But any other project on the part of the Washington Government with regard to the Philippines is certain to lead to an attempt to subject the American conditions of peace to revision.

It may be hoped that the United States will resist any such pretensions on the part of the Powers, pretensions which are unlikely to receive any support from Great Britain. None of the great Powers dared to make demands of this kind upon victorious Germany in 1871, and there is no reason why the United States should be subjected to any different treatment, since she occupies with regard to the Continental Powers of Europe a far more advantageous position than did Germany at the close of the war with France. Neither France nor Germany nor Russia, still less Austria or Italy, is in a position, either singly or collectively, to enforce any demand which they may make upon the United States in connection with the latter's conditions of peace, especially if Great Britain continues, as at present, to support the American cause.

England, with the United States, and possibly Japan, constitutes a combination quite powerful enough to resist any concert of the Continental Powers of Europe, and if the United States tolerates intervention by the latter in any form whatsoever, it will be merely repeating the lamentable mistake made at the close of the Chinese-Japanese war by the Mikado.

EX-ATTACHE.

# *SAILORS WHO RE-ENLIST.*

## ODD IDEAS OF THE JACKIES ABOUT TIME AND LIFE ON SHIP.

From The Washington Star.

On the day after his enlistment for a period of three years the American man-o'-war's man begins to figure on the amount of time that is to intervene before his discharge. He has two years and a "butt" to do, the "butt" being the remaining eleven months and twenty-nine days of the first year. On the day following his completion of the first year of his enlistment he has only a year and a butt to get through. No matter if the butt is only a single day under a year in length, the bluejacket contemplates the term with the blandest complaisance; it is not, at any rate, a whole year, even though it be three hundred and sixty-four days, and this fashion of throttling each year of his service makes him happy; it seems to bring his discharge, and the more or less tempestuous joys he carefully maps out long before his discharge, within closer range. When he has put in eighteen months of an enlistment, he breaks out the homeward-bound pennant; he is going down the hill; and when he has finally achieved two years and has only the butt to accomplish joy fills his cup.

"Once a sailor always a sailor" is not strictly true of men-o'-war's men of the American Navy. Only about one-half of the men who complete one enlistment ship for another three-year cruise. But about nine-tenths of the men who put in two cruises settle down to a life-long continuance in the service. Six years of Navy life seem to thoroughly inoculate them with what the Germans call wanderlust. When a bluejacket passes a few of his summers in the latitude of the North Cape and a couple of his winters down among the Bermudas or in the salubrious South Pacific he is likely to acquire a dislike for the climate of the United States, and this dislike has more weight than anything else in forming his decision to remain in the Navy. Moreover, after a few years in the Navy the bluejacket seems to become possessed of the odd idea that he is really doing nothing aboard ship to earn his pay, that the perpetual scurry in which he is kept from all hands in the morning until pipe down at night is really not work, and with this quaint notion he also acquires an exceedingly exaggerated idea of the terrific amount of grinding labor a man has to perform in order to gain a livelihood ashore. Put to a bluejacket who has put in a couple of naval cruises the direct question, "Are you going to 'ship over' when your time is out?" and in nine cases out of ten he will look you in the eye with an expression of stupefaction, and inquire:

"What do you think I'm going to do—work?"

Overtime men being shipped back to this country on a man-of-war are not compelled to do any of the ship's work; they simply stand the military calls, eat their meals and smoke their pipes, watching the while with lazy happiness the daily round of labor of the less fortunate bluejackets attached as members of the crew of the ship on which they themselves are practically passengers. The overtime men occasionally emit arrogantly humorous directions to these temporary shipmates, the ship's company of the boat that is hauling them home. "G'wan, now, an' shine up that bright work, ye long-time swab!" they will shout to a deckhand when the officer of the deck is aft and out of hearing, and, "Git down to your bunker, ye grimy flatfoot, and rake out your coal!" is the kind of thing the man of the black gang below hears from the "passengers" whenever he tries to smoke a peaceful pipe on the to'gallant fo'c'sle.

One of the immemorial customs of the Navy Jacks is to secrete in the ditty bag of the discharged shipmate who is about to go ashore a can of corned beef, a few potatoes and, perhaps, one or two other articles of sea food. This is done in order to remind the discharged man when he opens his bag as sure that in the opinion of his shipmates he will be unable to earn enough to eat on land if he takes it into his head not to ship over, and that they have therefore, taken a small measure to shield him from starvation with a little Navy grub when he has "spent his payday." Discharged men try all sorts of schemes to keep this stuff from being placed in their bags, but, nevertheless, they nearly always find it there when they get ashore.

# *AN OLD PARDON.*

From The Baltimore American.

William H. Gove, of Salem, Mass., with the purchase of his ancestral home at Seabrook, N. H., came into the possession of several documents, one being a pardon of Edward Gove, who was confined in the Tower of London for rebellion. It is dated 1685, and signed "Sutherland," and across the top are the words "James R." and the royal seal.

# TRAGEDIES IN THE ARMY.

## EVENTS THAT NEVER HAVE BEEN RECORDED IN HISTORY.

### QUARRELS BETWEEN OFFICERS—A STRAGGLER WHO WAS SHOT DEAD BY A STAFF CAPTAIN.

From The Chicago Times-Herald.

"Tragedies in our own camps—outside of battles—were more common than the public knows," said a distinguished soldier in attendance upon the recent reunion of the Army of the Tennessee.

"The shooting of Major-General Nelson at Louisville by Brigadier-General Jeff C. Davis because Nelson in a fit of anger had called Davis a long string of hard names, is one of the few that came to the surface. You wouldn't think it probable, but I myself was once so close to a tragedy that it makes my gray hair rise up as I recall it.

"While a number of officers of the regiment were in the major's tent I said something that a captain took exception to, and a war of words followed. When he plumped out, 'You are a liar!' I struck out with my right and set him to bleeding. He came back at me like a tiger cat. We clinched, and for three or four minutes had it hot and sharp; then the others separated us. He made all sorts of threats. I was adjutant. He ranked me, and I confess that for a time I did fear he would make me trouble in the way of a court-martial, but the matter seemed to blow over.

"One fall afternoon the captain invited me to take a walk with him. Thinking that our troubles had completely healed, I consented. On the way back to camp we passed through an orchard. I climbed a tree to get some apples. Just as I reached for an apple I saw the captain reach for his revolver and glare at me like a very fiend. Instantly I loosened my hold and dropped to the ground. Seizing a stake, I took my place by his side and said: 'Now, you cowardly dog, put up that gun or I'll brain you!' This time he was kept on a hot griddle for a month, though I made no threats and had no thought of reporting his attempt to assassinate me.

"The next fight we got into we made up for good and all, and remained fast friends until the final round-up, when General Joe Johnston had his men throw down their guns and go home to 'make a crop.' It happened in this way: The colonel had given the order to form line of battle. As adjutant it was my duty to see that each captain carried out the order. When I reached the would-be assassin and had performed my duty and started to go away he called out: 'Adjutant, come back!' When I complied he took my hand, looked me squarely in the eye, and said: 'Lieutenant, can you forgive me for all of my meanness to you? I hope so. I have never had a good hour since that incident in the orchard.'

"'With all my heart, captain. No one but you and myself knows anything about that little affair.'

"As I said, nothing else came up to separate us while in the Army. We never met after being mustered out. He died three years ago. Of course, I could have sent him out of the Army in disgrace and placed him in the penitentiary after he was out, but I've always been glad I did not. He was a good soldier in battle, as brave as they made them, but a bulldog in camp. He left the Army a major. His name? Never mind that. It is a true story. I wish it were not, for I cannot forget that at one time in my life I was in a fair way to be murdered."

A captain on the staff of a division commander at the battle of Gettysburg, who afterward became a general and commanded a division himself for a time, once told me that if he had it he would willingly give a million dollars if he could forget and never recall a Gettysburg tragedy.

"We needed every man in line," said the general. "Orders had been given to let no well or unwounded man go to the rear. Our general had told the whole staff that if we couldn't stop stragglers any other way to shoot them down. As soon as the firing began a certain class fled from the front, and the staff flew at them on their horses and pushed them back into the ranks. It was always a job I hated. It made me mad to see a fellow run away from his comrades when they were in trouble, and I used to be rougher with them than I wanted to be with any class of God's creatures. The enemy was pressing our line very hard. A break was greatly feared. Back came another cluster of stragglers, big, hearty fellows, who never stay under fire a second longer than they are forced to stay. I made direct for three of them with my drawn sword. Two of them went back to duty. The third told me to go where it was hotter than it was that hottest day at Gettysburg, and said he was going back, no matter if the whole staff stood in the way. 'Go back to your place instantly!' I demanded. At that he cocked his rifle and was lifting the barrel so that I would get its contents. Down went my sword to the ground and out came my revolver. Quicker than I can tell you it cracked, and the man fell dead. Yes, it was a case of shoot him or be shot. I only wanted to disable him, but that was no time to hunt for a good place to disable without killing. A second more and he would have killed me."

"Then, why do you say you would give a million dollars to forget the incident?"

"It is an awful thing to kill a human being. I can see just how that man fell back with an oath on his lips. I don't like it. You wouldn't. I have commanded companies, a regiment, a brigade and a division to do wholesale killing in battle. That was what we enlisted to do. That is different from shooting a man, one of your own soldiers, at your side. I shall always regret that it became my duty to have a hand in that Army tragedy."

# *AT THE FALL OF THE CURTAIN.*

The curtain's falling, and the lights burn low,
So, with God's help, I'm ready now to go.
I've seen life's melodrama, paid the price,
Have known its loves and losses, hopes and fears,
The laughter and the tears,
And now, God knows, I would not see it twice.

I've crossed life's ocean, faced its blinding foam,
But now Heaven whispers I am nearing home.
And though a storm-tossed hull I reach the shore,
A thing of tattered sheets and broken spars,
Naked against the stars,
I soon shall be at peace forever more.

For if again I pass these waters through,
I know the kingdom I am sailing to.
What boots it where I lie?—beneath the sod,
Or down the dark impenetrable deep,
Where wayworn seamen sleep?
All gates are good through which we pass to God.

—(Blackwood's Magazine.